This post is motivated by a conversation that Gina and I had about "quality" design. In our class, "quality" design is measured via the utilization of CARP (Contrast, Alignment, Repetition, and Proximity).
It is interesting that this seems strikingly similar to the 5 paragraph essay, which used to be a measure for "quality" academic writing, with its 5 paragraph structure, and within that structure TEA elements: Topic sentence, Example/Evidence, and Analysis; yet, somewhere down the line, the 5 paragraph essay was thought of as too limiting to serve greater purposes.
I wonder if the same will happen for design - will it be liberated from CARP? Or will design take an opposite turn and become more rigid since it is visual and visuals are taken in as a whole? Do rules for design negate the nature of design?
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
A Response to Barbara Stafford
First, I must respond to the verbiage of Stafford's article, "Visual Pragmatism for a Virtual World" and how it is so emotionally evocative. She uses words and phrases, such as:
· Extinction
· Iconoclasm
· Puritanical myth
· Combat the sophism
· Totemization of language
· Godlike agency
· Dominant
Her use of such words automatically registers with me as a passionate attempt to get her point across, while using the above "light switch" words - that when they are read, they flip an emotional switch in the brain of the reader (again, writing for the appropriate emotional response). It is ironic how she argues that images must be freed from "…an unnuanced dominant discourse of consumerism, corruption, deception, and ethical failure…" (210); yet her article is rife with verbal rhetoric that causes skepticism in me because these are spin-worthy talking points. No image is necessary for me to suspect: all human communication is now worthy of suspicion.
Stafford's article evidences that the image is considered suspect, while it must not be since the image is the wave of the Virtual/Digital world. Moreover, Stafford makes the argument that the visual is unfairly held as suspect, while it is the text that should be held liable for making communicators disembodied via abstraction (212). She remarks that continued focus on the importance and authenticity of language reduces human cognition to a computational code and that forcing humans to continually work with abstract, textual notions will result in reducing their "…sensory awareness to superficial stimuli and false perceptions" (211). Unfortunately, in both the case of the image and the text, human perception cannot be relied on, and this is no fault of the image or text, but rather, just being human.
It is ironic that she considers text to be more computational and thus, a downgrading of the senses, while virtual worlds might end up revealing that humans are compatible with machines - that sensory or emotional responses can be controlled, if not manufactured. That the photograph is seen as more realistic than the diagram could represent Baudrillard's simulacra argument: that we will be immersed in copies of copies, unable to differentiate between the real and the fake. If this is not a downgrading of sensory perception, I'm not sure what is. If we want to get away from sensory downgrading, we should use more body language than anything.
She continues to argue that writing is identified, in the western world, as intellectual potency while the goal should be to implant our intellectual markings into images since cognition does not have to be linguistic (210-12). I argue that, yes, writing demonstrates our brains in a visual context because writing makes thought visible, and so it only makes sense to have writing demonstrate and act as a measure for intellect.
I need a clearer explanation, however, about how our cognition is not primarily linguistic. It seems that, to make sense of the world, we must explain things to ourselves, and others, via words of some sort. When I see a picture of a cat, my brain is so accustomed to the identification of "cat" that I do not notice that I say "cat" to myself. I simply see it, and it is - but I fail to see how this is not a linguistic act and would appreciate someone enlightening me on it.
There is a cultural comment to be made when Stafford references spectatorship as being considered "…empty gaping, not thought provoking attention" (215). I do not think this is the fault of images, BUT I do think this is the fault of TV (and because TV is image-laden, images take up the blame). I do attribute spectatorship to be a less-intellectual activity because it is a distraction. It is also a path to societal voyeurism - where we become much more interested in watching other people live their lives than in living our own. It is easier, after all. This perception can be changed with the critical thinking about what is being watched and why and what the images show and how - but sometimes, I don't want to be critical when I'm watching Hell's Kitchen or TAPS or, God forbid, The Bachelor, but I should be aware that while watching those shows, I'm missing out on my own cooking, ghost hunting, and relationship-building.
So, yes, the word voyeurism is bound to pop up regarding images when images do work (with text) to sell us products, ideas, or the lives of other people. Yet, again, I say, it is not the fault of the image. It is the fault of being human. Humans are the tricksters behind the image. Always. Stop being human, and it can be fixed! (And hey, as I've alluded to - we're already on our way!) So, I just want to applaud Stafford on the argument that the focus tends to be on "the taintedness of the instrument" and "not the fallibility of the errant perceiver" (216). Her argument here is the key argument when it comes to distrusting images and why one shouldn't merely because it is an image.
However, Stafford enters into a problematic argument when she writes contradictory statements:
"Contemporary iconcolcasm…rests on the puritanical myth of an authentic…epistemological origin" (210)
Vs.
"We have lost faith in the creation of good images" (215).
If there is no epistemological origin, how can we have any faith in the creation of good images? What is a "good" image? Again, we can never seem to extricate ourselves from the notion of an absolute Truth.
One last thing, Stafford mentions that we live in a deregulated society and that citizens find themselves deregulated (217). Why do citizens need to be regulated? That is a question for you.
· Extinction
· Iconoclasm
· Puritanical myth
· Combat the sophism
· Totemization of language
· Godlike agency
· Dominant
Her use of such words automatically registers with me as a passionate attempt to get her point across, while using the above "light switch" words - that when they are read, they flip an emotional switch in the brain of the reader (again, writing for the appropriate emotional response). It is ironic how she argues that images must be freed from "…an unnuanced dominant discourse of consumerism, corruption, deception, and ethical failure…" (210); yet her article is rife with verbal rhetoric that causes skepticism in me because these are spin-worthy talking points. No image is necessary for me to suspect: all human communication is now worthy of suspicion.
Stafford's article evidences that the image is considered suspect, while it must not be since the image is the wave of the Virtual/Digital world. Moreover, Stafford makes the argument that the visual is unfairly held as suspect, while it is the text that should be held liable for making communicators disembodied via abstraction (212). She remarks that continued focus on the importance and authenticity of language reduces human cognition to a computational code and that forcing humans to continually work with abstract, textual notions will result in reducing their "…sensory awareness to superficial stimuli and false perceptions" (211). Unfortunately, in both the case of the image and the text, human perception cannot be relied on, and this is no fault of the image or text, but rather, just being human.
It is ironic that she considers text to be more computational and thus, a downgrading of the senses, while virtual worlds might end up revealing that humans are compatible with machines - that sensory or emotional responses can be controlled, if not manufactured. That the photograph is seen as more realistic than the diagram could represent Baudrillard's simulacra argument: that we will be immersed in copies of copies, unable to differentiate between the real and the fake. If this is not a downgrading of sensory perception, I'm not sure what is. If we want to get away from sensory downgrading, we should use more body language than anything.
She continues to argue that writing is identified, in the western world, as intellectual potency while the goal should be to implant our intellectual markings into images since cognition does not have to be linguistic (210-12). I argue that, yes, writing demonstrates our brains in a visual context because writing makes thought visible, and so it only makes sense to have writing demonstrate and act as a measure for intellect.
I need a clearer explanation, however, about how our cognition is not primarily linguistic. It seems that, to make sense of the world, we must explain things to ourselves, and others, via words of some sort. When I see a picture of a cat, my brain is so accustomed to the identification of "cat" that I do not notice that I say "cat" to myself. I simply see it, and it is - but I fail to see how this is not a linguistic act and would appreciate someone enlightening me on it.
There is a cultural comment to be made when Stafford references spectatorship as being considered "…empty gaping, not thought provoking attention" (215). I do not think this is the fault of images, BUT I do think this is the fault of TV (and because TV is image-laden, images take up the blame). I do attribute spectatorship to be a less-intellectual activity because it is a distraction. It is also a path to societal voyeurism - where we become much more interested in watching other people live their lives than in living our own. It is easier, after all. This perception can be changed with the critical thinking about what is being watched and why and what the images show and how - but sometimes, I don't want to be critical when I'm watching Hell's Kitchen or TAPS or, God forbid, The Bachelor, but I should be aware that while watching those shows, I'm missing out on my own cooking, ghost hunting, and relationship-building.
So, yes, the word voyeurism is bound to pop up regarding images when images do work (with text) to sell us products, ideas, or the lives of other people. Yet, again, I say, it is not the fault of the image. It is the fault of being human. Humans are the tricksters behind the image. Always. Stop being human, and it can be fixed! (And hey, as I've alluded to - we're already on our way!) So, I just want to applaud Stafford on the argument that the focus tends to be on "the taintedness of the instrument" and "not the fallibility of the errant perceiver" (216). Her argument here is the key argument when it comes to distrusting images and why one shouldn't merely because it is an image.
However, Stafford enters into a problematic argument when she writes contradictory statements:
"Contemporary iconcolcasm…rests on the puritanical myth of an authentic…epistemological origin" (210)
Vs.
"We have lost faith in the creation of good images" (215).
If there is no epistemological origin, how can we have any faith in the creation of good images? What is a "good" image? Again, we can never seem to extricate ourselves from the notion of an absolute Truth.
One last thing, Stafford mentions that we live in a deregulated society and that citizens find themselves deregulated (217). Why do citizens need to be regulated? That is a question for you.
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